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JURISDICTION
The Appellee, Loel D. Thometz ("Thometz") does not dispute
the Jurisdiction section which appears upon page 1 of Appellant's
Brief.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Thometz submits the following objections to the Statement
of Issues section which appears upon pages 1 to 5 of Appellant's
Brief:
1.

Appellant's Issue I, which asserts that the

Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in applying the prima
facie case method of analysis established by McDonnell-Douglas
Corp, v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), is not properly before the
Court, due to Appellant's failure to preserve such issue within
its Motion for Review, dated April 11, 1995 (R. 761-769).

Utah

law states that alleged errors within agency orders that are not
brought to the attention of the agency by way of a motion for
review are waived.

Ashcroft v. Industrial Com'n. of Utah, 855

P.2d 267, 268 (Utah App. 1993).
Further, Appellant's Issue I erroneously assumes that
the ALJ based his decision in this case solely upon a finding
that Thometz established a prima facie case of age
discrimination.

In fact, the ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions

of Law and Order, dated March 13, 1995 ("Order") (R. 748-760),
1

clearly reflects that the ALJfs analysis properly focused upon
the essential issue in the case, ie„, whether Thometzf age was a
determining factor in his selection for reduction in force
("RIF").

Faulkner v. Super Value Stores, 3 F.3d 1419, 1425 (10th

Cir. 1993).
2.

Appellant's Issues II, III, IV, VIII and X challenge

the ALJ's findings of fact under the substantial evidence
standard of review.

However, said Issues are not properly before

the Court because Appellant has made no attempt to marshal1 the
evidence in support of the ALJ's findings, as required by Utah
law,

Qneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage, 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-54

(Utah App. 1994).
Further, Appellant's Issues III, IV, V and VIII
improperly designate as separate issues specific items of
evidence which support the ALJ's finding that age was a
determining factor in Thometz' selection for RIF.

Appellant's

Issues III, IV, V and VIII are all included within the section of
Appellant's Argument which challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence

(Appellant's Brief at pages 23-37).

The specific items

of evidence which are challenged within Appellant's Issues III,
IV, V and VIII are not independently required to meet the
substantial evidence test.

Larson Limestone Co. v. State Div. of

Oil, Gas & Mining, 903 P.2d 429, 430 (Utah 1995).
3.

Appellant's Issues VI and VII erroneously designate as

issues of law issues which are clearly factual in nature.

Said

issues are both included, along with Appellant's Issues III, IV,
2

V and VIII, within the section of Appellant's Argument which
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence (Appellant's Brief,
pages 32-37).

Further, to the extent that such issues constitute

alleged errors of law, they were not preserved within Appellant's
Motion for Review (R. 761-769).
4.

Appellant's Issue IX erroneously asserts that the

Agency determined that Thometz had no duty to mitigate his
damages.

The Agency made no such determination.

The Agency

merely noted that Appellant could have mitigated its own damages
by reinstating Thometz, as Appellant was ordered to do within the
Order of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division ("UADD") dated
February 9, 1994 (R 10-17; 748-760; 816-820).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Thometz does not dispute the Nature of the Case, Course of
the Proceedings, and Disposition of the Agency sections which
appear upon pages 5 to 7 of Appellant's Brief.
Thometz objects to the Statement of Facts section which
appears upon pages 7 to 26 of Appellant's Brief, on the grounds
that Appellant has made no effort to marshal1 the evidence in
support of the ALJ's decision, and has merely presented selected
facts in support of Appellant's position.

Such approach

improperly burdens the Court and the Appellees, and is contrary
to Utah law.

Oneida/SLIC, 872 P.2d at 1053-1054.

3

The improper burden which Appellantfs failure to marshall
the evidence has placed upon Thometz is demonstrated, in part,
by the following facts which are not even mentioned within
Appellant's Brief:
(a)

At the time of Thometz1 termination, Thometz had

a higher overall rating on his most recent Performance Appraisal
Report ("PAR") than one of the younger employees who was retained
by Appellant (R. 256-268).
(b)

During the reduction in force ("RIF") in which

Thometz was terminated, 9 out of the 15 employees who were RIFed
from Thometz1 department were over the age of 40, and 8 of such
employees, including Thometz, were over the age of 50 (R. 219).
(c)

Lisa Hughes ("Hughes") who was Thometz1 manager

and the person who selected Thometz for RIF, did not review any
documentation, nor talk to any of her employees regarding their
skills or experiencef in relation to her RIF Selection (R. 1020).
Hughes did not have detailed knowledge concerning the work
performed by the employees within her department (R. 1044).
Hughes created no documentation in conjunction with her RIF
selection, except for the ranking sheet (R. 1008; 1032).

In sum,

Hughes had little if any objective criteria upon which to base
her selection of Thometz for RIF.
(d) Hughes allegedly based her selection of Thometz
for RIF upon the alleged fact that Thometz1 experience within the
Specialty Structures facility, which Hughes supervised, was
limited to one program that was ending (R. 1022; 1030; 1044-55).
4

However, Appellant's own work records support the testimony of
Thometz and Chuck Walker ("Walker") that Thometz worked upon all
of the programs within the Special Structures facility, and that
the program which was allegedly ending continued to require
substantial work until at least November 16, 1992 (R. 205; 375386; 859-862; 939-941).

Further, Thometz testified that Hughes

personally observed him performing work on a variety of programs
within the Specialty Structures facility

(R. 860-861).

The ALJ

expressly found that Hughes1 testimony of this issue lacks
credibility (R. 780).
These examples demonstrate the burden which has been placed
upon Thometz due to Appellant's failure to marshall the evidence
in support of the ALJ's findings.

Appellant has improperly

shifted to Thometz the burden of summarizing the entire
proceeding within the Agency in order to rebut Appellant's
selected allegations of error.
Without waiving such objection, Thometz responds to the
specific numbered paragraphs of Appellant's Statement of Facts as
follows:
1.

Thometz admits the allegations of Paragraph 1 of

Appellant's Statement of Facts. However, the persons who hired
Thometz at the age of 45 were not involved in Thometz1 RIF
selection eight years later (R. 839). In fact, Walker, who
participated in hiring Thometz, testified that Thometz' selection
for RIF may have been motivated by his age (R. 943).

5

2-3.

Thometz admits the allegations of Paragraphs 2-3 of

Appellant's Statement of Facts, which briefly describe Thometz1
work history at Hercules.

However, Appellant makes no reference

to the outstanding PARs which Thometz received (R. 279-297), or
to the awards and commendations which Thometz received (R. 298301), or of Thometz1 assignment to particularly technical work
assignments due to Thometz1 demonstrated work performance (R.
952, 981).
4.

Paragraph 4 of Appellant's Statement of Facts, which

describes the extensive RIFs which Appellant has experienced due
to economic downturns in the aerospace and defense industries, is
not disputed by Thometz.

However, such facts are not relevant to

the issue of whether Thometz1 selection for RIF was substantially
motivated by his age.

Age discrimination may occur during RIFs

which are economically motivated.

James v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,

Inc., 21 F.3d 898 (10th Cir. 1994); Branson v. Price River Coal
Co., 853 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1988).
5-8c

Appellant's Statement of Facts, Paragraphs 5-8,

contain numerous allegations regarding the RIF policy which
Appellant had in effect at the time of Thometz1 RIF (R. 30-36).
Thometz doe3 not dispute that said RIF Policy was in effect.
However, many of the specific provisions of said RIF Policy were
not applied in Thometz1 case.
(a)

Specifically:

The criteria of "prior experience", "education

applicable to the job," "relative ability" and
"adjusted service date/then continuous service" which are
6

identified as factors to be considered within Section I. of
Appellant's RIF Policy (R. 33), were given no consideration in
relation to Thometz' RIF (R. 1020-1021).
(b) The Business Group or Unit did not design a new
organization indicating the changes and reductions on the new
organization chart, as required by Section II. of the RIF Policy
(R. 33; 1031-1032).
(c) The Unit Executive did not prepare copies of the
current organization chart identifying those positions to be
eliminated, transferred or combined, or identifying the current
incumbents for each position, as required by Section II.a. of the
RIF Policy (R. 1033-1034).

Appellant does not even know who the

Unit Executive was in relation to Thometzf RIF (R. 1031; 1037).
(d) The Unit Executive did not prepare a new
organization chart identifying the recommended candidate for each
position, as required by Section II.b. of the RIF Policy (R. 34;
1034).
(e) The Unit Executive did not prepare a listing of
each person selected for RIF with the information required by
Section II.c. of the RIF Policy (R. 34; 1034-1037).
(f)

It is not known whether the Unit Executive

presented his/her rationale for the RIF selection to the PCC, as
required by Section III.a. of the RIF Policy (R. 34), inasmuch as
none of Appellant's agents recall what, specifically, was said
regarding the reasons for Thometz' selection for RIF, and no

7

documents were created which reflect any such reasons (R. 10311033; 1060-1061; 1093-1095).

Hughes testified regarding her

meeting with the PCC as follows:
Q.
A,
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

(g)

What was said during that meeting?
Went through the rankings, I was asked questions
by the committee.
What were some of the questions you were asked by
the committee?
Why people were ranked, you know, why were the
people ranked as they were? Why one individual
was better than another individual, those were the
types of questions.
Did you respond to those questions?
I did. And particularly, you know, most of the
questions is centered around depicting out some of
the, in all honesty, the younger people going, why
is this person better than someone else? And I
went through and I discussed everything based on
people's performance or competency in those
additional areas.
Was there any discussion as to the greater
performance evaluations during the PCC meeting?
No. They were basing it off of my performance
with those individuals over the last period of
time, I guess, since those people had been in my
department, for the year (R. 1031-1032).
Thometz was not provided at least 25 days notice

of his RIF, as required by Section V. of the RIF Policy (R. 36,
1039-1040).
9.

Thometz does not dispute Paragraph 9 of Appellant's

Statement of Facts.
10.

With reference to Paragraph 10 of Appellant's Statement

of Facts, there are numerous iacts which support the ALJ's
determination that Appellant's professed non-discriminatory
justification is pretextual, including the following:

8

(a) At the time of Thometz1 RIF, Thometz had a higher
rating on his most recent PAR than one of the younger employees
who was retained

(R.

256-268).

(b) Hughes admits that she did not review any
documents, including PARs or employee work histories, in making
her RIF selection, which is contrary to Appellant's RIF Policy.
Hughes states that her RIF selection was based solely upon her
personal observations of the employees in the workplace (R. 10311032).

However, Hughes also states that she was not aware of the

details of such employees1 work performance (R. 1044).
(c) Hughes did not create any documentation which
supports or reflects her selection of Thometz for RIF, which is
contrary to Appellant's RIF Policy (R. 30-36; 1008; 1032).
(d) Although Hughes testified that Thometz worked only
on one program, "the Tubes", which program was winding down at
the time of the RIF, Appellant's records support the testimony of
Thometz and Walker that Thometz worked on all of the programs
within the Specialty Structures facility, and that the Tubes
program was not winding down (R. 205; 375-386; 859-862; 939-941).
Further, Thometz testified that Hughes directly observed Thometz
working on the various projects within the facility (R. 860-861).
The ALJ expressly found that Hughes1 testimony that Thometz
worked on only one program, and/or that Hughes was not aware of
the work that Thometz was performing, was not credible (R. 780).

9

11-15.

Paragraphs 11-15 of Appellant's Statement of Facts

contain numerous allegations regarding the testimony of Gerry
Nuttal, ("Nuttal") who was Thometz1 direct supervisor, and who
also ranked Thometz last of the employees within the Specialty
Structures facility.

Thometz does not believe that Nuttalfs

ranking was motivated by age discrimination (R. 1157).

Nuttalfs

testimony constitutes the primary evidence in support of
Appellant's position, and is probably the primary issue on this
Appeal.
Nuttal resigned his employment with Hercules during April of
1992, which was four months prior to Thometz' RIF (R. 1104).

At

that time, Thometz had been under Nuttalfs supervision for only a
short time, and Nuttal testified that he had little contact with
Thometz (R. 1115).
Although Thometz was ranked by Hughes and Nuttal in
approximately April of 1992, Hughes department was not affected
by the RIF which occurred at that time (R. 815; 1007-1008; 1014).
During June of 1992, after Nuttal's retirement, Hughes was
informed that another RIF would occur, wherein her department
would be required to eliminate two employees (R. 1014).

One

employee voluntarily resigned prior to the RIF, and Thometz was
RIFed on August 12, 1992 (R. 1092).
After the initial ranking in April, 1992, Hughes made no
additional ranking in relation to the subsequent RIF wherein
Thometz was terminated, which violates Appellant's RIF Policy,
and is contrary to Hughes and Nuttal's former practice of ranking
10

the employees on approximately a monthly basis (R. 1008; 1109).
Hughes did not discuss Thometz1 RIF selection with Cary Elder
("Elder"), who replaced Nuttal as Thometz1 supervisor for a
period of approximately four months prior to Thometz* RIF (R.
1018-1019).

Appellant did not call Elder as a witness at the

formal hearing in this case.
The ALJ carefully considered Nuttal's testimony, and
concluded that: "Mr. Nuttal had no independent authority to
construct the [RIF] list, and the list was the product of Ms.
Hughes1 thought processes, and her understanding of [Thometzf]
strengths and weaknesses" (R. 779-780).

Such finding is

consistent with Nuttal!s own testimony, wherein Nuttal stated:
Q.
A*
16.

Was Mr. Thometz terminated because of his age?
I have no idea. I wasn't there when he was
terminated (R. 1113).

Paragraph 16 of Appellant's Statement of Facts quotes

Hughes' self-serving testimony that age was not a consideration
in Thometz' RIF selection.

Notably, Appellant's Statement of

Facts contains no reference to the comment which Hughes made to
Thometz during approximately April of 1992 that Thometz should
"let some of the younger guys" do a particular task which Thometz
was performing (R. 1154).

Hughes does not deny making such

comment (R. 1114).
Footnote 3 to Paragraph 16 of Appellant's Statement of
Facts refers to two criticisms of Thometz' work performance by
Hughes.

Such criticisms constitute the only criticisms of

Thometz' work performance which have been identified by
11

Appellant,

One of the criticisms refers to an occasion upon

which Thometz allegedly took too long to inspect a B-52F
fuselage, and made some type of unspecified error.

This alleged

incident occurred soon after Thometzf transfer into the Specialty
Structures facility,

and was not sufficiently serious that

Hughes even talked to Thometz about it (R. 1047-1049).

The other

criticism refers to a dispute which Thometz had with some of the
production area employees.

This incident also occurred soon

after Thometz1 transfer into the Specialty Structures facility.
At the time, Hughes supported Thometz and determined that Thometz
had properly halted production (R. 1049-1052; 1152-1154).

These

are the only two occasions upon which deficiencies in Thometz1
work performance have been identified, both incidents occurred
shortly after Thometzf transfer into the Specialty Structures
facility, and there is no allegation of any subsequent problems
or deficiencies.
17.

Paragraph 17 of Appellant's Statement of Facts sets

forth Hughes1 alleged reasons for not considering Thometz1 most
recent PAR in conjunction with her selection of Thometz for RIF.
Essentially, Hughes claims that she was a harder rater than the
supervisor who had prepared Thometz1 most recent PAR.

However,

the fact is that Hughes never even looked at Thometz' most recent
PAR prior to his RIF.

Hughes first saw Thometz1 November, 1991

PAR during the formal hearing in this case (R. 1026).

Therefore,

Hughes1 alleged rationale for not considering Thometz1 PAR is a
pretext.
12

Appellant's RIF Policy expressly states that PARs should be
considered in the RIF selection process, and contains no
exception for PARs which are prepared by differing supervisors
(R. 34). Hughes clearly did not comply with the RIF Policy.

Nor

did Hughes contact Thometz1 former supervisor, Larry Bradford
("Bradford"), who had previously supervised both Thometz and coworker Jose Garcia ("Garcia").

Garcia was one of the younger

employees who was retained within the Specialty Structures
facility at the time of Thometz1 RIF.

Bradford considered

Thometz to be a much more valuable employee than Garcia

(R.

959).
Footnote 4 to Paragraph 17 of Appellant's Statement of Facts
refers to testimony by Nuttal that he would have rated Thometz at
"C-minus" (i.e., less than fully competent) had he performed a
PAR on Thometz prior to Nuttalfs retirement (R. 1125-1126).
(Garcia received a "C-minus" within his December, 1991 PAR.)
However, Nuttal repeatedly testified that Thometz was a competent
employee

(R. 1108; 1124).

Nuttal testified that the only reason

that he would have rated Thometz as less than competent was
Thometz1 lack of experience in the Specialty Structures facility
(R. 1125).

As previously noted, Nuttal!s experience with Thometz

was limited to approximately the first four months that Thometz
worked in the Specialty Structures facility, after which time
Nuttal retired.

Nuttal was not involved in Thometz1 RIF in

August of 1992.

13

18.

Paragraph 18 of Appellant's Statement of Facts quotes

the self-serving testimony of John Bailey ("Bailey"), Hercules1
Director of Human Resources, to the effect that the personal
observations of the supervisors are the most valuable criterion
for RIF selection, as opposed to documented PARs or work
histories

(R. 1094; 1101-1102).

There is nothing within

Appellant's RIF Policy which supports Bailey's opinion in this
regard.

Bailey admitted during cross-examination that review of

employees1 documented work history is necessary to protect
employees against discrimination (R. 1093).

In the present case,

neither Hughes nor the PCC reviewed any documents in relation to
Thometz' selection for RIF
19.

(R. 1009; 1026; 1032).

Thometz admits the allegations of Paragraph 19 of

Appellant's Statement of Facts.

Bradshaw, Walker and Dan Vilart

("Vilart") all testified that Thometz was clearly a superior
employee to Garcia (R. 936-938; 959; 975-976).
20.

Thometz admits the allegations of Paragraph 20 of

Appellant's Statement of Facts.

However, contrary to Appellant's

implication that Walker had insufficient contact with Garcia to
form an accurate impression regarding Garcia's work performance,
Walker testified in considerable detail regarding the work
performance of Garcia and the other employees within the
Specialty Structures facility (R. 931-943).

Walker's awareness

of the activities within the Specialty Structures facility
supports the ALJ's finding that Hughes' professed lack of
awareness of such facts is pretextual
14

(R. 757).

21.

With reference to Paragraph 21 of Appellant's Statement

of Facts, Thometz admits that Vilart was RIFed at approximately
the same time as Thometz, and that, in Vilart1s opinion, both he
and Thometz were RIFed because of their age (R. 976-977; 980).
Vilartfs comparison of Thometz and Garcia was based upon his
experience with both employees during the time that they worked
within the HTS facility of the Composite Structures Department
(R. 972-976).

The job functions within the HTS facility were

very similar to those within the Specialty Structures facility
(R. 854; 990). Vilart testified that the tasks within the
"closed" section of HTS, where Thometz worked, were more
technical than those within the "open" section where Garcia
worked
22.

(R. 981).
With reference to Paragraph 22 of Appellant's Statement

of Facts, Bradford, who supervised both Thometz and Garcia within
the HTS facility, compared Thometz and Garcia as follows:
Q.
A.

23.

Well, how would you compare, if at all, Mr.
Thometz1 work performance to that of Mr. Garcia
during the time that they worked for you?
I would describe them as probably equivalent or
maybe just slightly an edge to Loel. The
difference in my opinion between those two
individuals is that Joe had far less capability
than Loel, far less experience. Joe can do one
thing, and he does a pretty good job of it. But
Loel had experience in several areas, which I
thought made him a much more valuable employee
overall. (R. 959).

With reference to Paragraph 23 of Appellantfs

Statement of Facts, Thometz admits that Hughes1 ranking list "was
presented, reviewed and approved by the PCC on April 21, 1992."
15

In fact, the entire process occurred during a single meeting
which could not have lasted more than an hour (R. 1033; 1095).
By the time that Hughes left the meeting, the PCC had approved
her RIF selection (R. 1039).

The RIF list appears to have been

the only document that was reviewed or prepared in conjunction
with Thometz1 RIF (R. 1009; 1013; 1026; 1031-1034; 1037; 1094).
The PCC had no further involvement in Thometz1 RIF (R. 1033).
However, Thometz was not terminated until a subsequent RIF
occurred during August of 1992 (R. 1007-1008; 1014).
24.

Paragraph 24 of Appellant's Statement of Facts contains

a quotation from Bailey wherein he attempts to explain the reason
that information regarding protected class status, including
Thometz1 age, appears upon documents prepared by the PCC in
relation to Thometz1 RIF.
Bailey's testimony as a whole reflects that he had no
satisfactory explanation for the PCCfs consideration of protected
class status, either in general or specifically as it related to
Thometz.

Bailey testified under cross-examination:
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

I believe you indicated that some of the notations
on these documents regarding membership and
protected class and whatnot were placed there for
the purpose of ensuring compliance with all of the
applicable laws; is that correct?
It was placed there to provide information to the
members of the PCC of those people in protected
groups so they could comply with the laws.
Couldn't the PCC comply with the laws simply by
making their determinations based upon job
performance rather than nondiscriminatory
criteria?
That's what they did.
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Q.
A.
Q.
A.

And why would they require information regarding
membership in protected class?
Because they requested it.
Do you have any idea why the membership of the PCC
requested that information?
Theyfve requested it since the first PCC we ever
had (R. 1097).

There is no evidence in this case as to what, if any,
use the PCC made of the information which it had with respect to
Thometz1 age.

There is certainly no evidence that Thometz* RIF

selection received any heightened degree of scrutiny due to the
PCCfs knowledge of his age.

The ALJ found in regard to this

issue:
There is really no reason to consider the age, race
gender, national origin or other impermissible factors
when a person is determined to be eligible for a RIF
based upon performance characteristics. Writing down
such characteristics tends to bolster the view that
improper factors were being considered. Value to
Hercules was the professed criterium which Hercules
claims was the most important attribute. That should
have been the factor which was preeminent in the minds
of the PCC and the supervisor. There is at least some
evidence that other illegal factors were considered,
and although Hercules may argue that the PCC did the
antidiscrimination job for which it was created, there
was little evidence that the PCC acted as the Hercules1
Reduction in Force Policy stated that it would. (R.
755-756).
25-26.

Appellant's Statement of Facts, Paragraphs 25 and

26, contain allegations relating to Thometz1 efforts to obtain
employment subsequent to his RIF from Hercules.

Thometz secured

new full-time employment within less than two months after his
RIF from Hercules, while simultaneously attempting to establish
his own business (R. 883-885).

Thometz terminated said

employment when his employer moved to Kaysville, Utah, and
Thometz then sought and secured other employment (R. 906-908).
17

Appellant produced no evidence suggesting that Thometz
failed to mitigate his damages.

Appellant could have mitigated

its damages by reinstating Thometz to employment as per the Order
of the UADD, dated February 9, 1994 (R. 17).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Thometz disputes the allegation contained within the Summary
of Argument section of Appellant's Brief, pages 18-19, that "the
ALJ completely overlooked Thometz1 testimony that his supervisor,
whose ranking of Thometz was the same as the one approved by the
PCC, was not biased against him because of his age."

As set

forth within Paragraphs 11-15 of the foregoing Statement of
Facts, the ALJ expressly considered Nuttalfs testimony i*i detail
(R. 756-757).

Appellant merely disagrees with the ALJfs analysis

of Nuttal1s testimony.
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ARGUMENT

I.

APPELLANT DID NOT PRESERVE ANY ARGUMENT THAT THE ALJ
APPLIED AN IMPROPER LEGAL STANDARD, NOR DID THE ALJ APPLY
AN IMPROPER LEGAL STANDARD.
Section I of Appellant's Argument (Appellant's Brief, pages

20-23), alleges that the ALJ applied an improper standard in
determining Thometz1 claim, in that the ALJ decided in Thometz1
favor based solely upon a finding that Thometz established a
prima facie case of age discrimination.
Appellant did not raise this issue within the Motion for
Review which Appellant filed with the Agency

(R. 761-769).

Therefore, this issue is not properly raised on Appeal.
Industrial Com'n of Utah, 694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1984).

Pease v.
The

requirements relating to motions for review of administrative
orders are applicable to employment discrimination cases.
Maverik Country Stores v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 860 P.2d 944,
947-948 (Utah App. 1993).
Without waiving his objection that Appellant failed to
preserve any alleged legal error, Thometz responds to the merits
of Appellant's argument as follows:
The ALJ committed no error in his analysis of this
case.

The ALJ repeatedly and correctly observed that the

essential issue in an age discrimination case is whether age was
a determining factor in regard to the adverse employment action
(R. 749, 757). Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 49 F.3d 1450, 145455 (10th Cir. 1994).

The ALJ performed a detailed analysis of
19

Appellantfs professed non-discriminatory justification i.e.,
"value to Hercules", and found that such professed justification
lacks credibility under the circumstances of this case (R. 754757).

Further, the ALJ expressly considered the prima facie case

factors in ruling upon Appellant's motion for judgment as a
matter of law

(R. 1074-1078).

Appellant's Brief contains no

reference to this portion of the ALJ's decision.
The prima facie case method of analysis is not intended to
provide a formalistic approach to the determination of employment
discrimination cases. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802,
note 13; United States Postal Service v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
715 (1983).

Further, the prima facie case method applies only to

circumstantial evidence of employment discrimination.

It is

inapplicable where there is direct evidence of discrimination.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,
(1985).

469 U.S. Ill, 121

In the present case, the ALJ relied substantially upon

direct evidence of discrimination, i.e., Hughes1 comment
regarding Thometzf age

(R. 753-754).

Further, in the present case, all of the elements of the
prima facie case were either conceded by Appellant or were
clearly met by Thometz.

The only element of the prima facie case

which Appellant did not concede is element (4): "that [Plaintiff]
was less favorably treated than younger employees during the
reduction of force."

Appellant's Brief, page 20.

is not seriously disputed in this case.

Thometz was the oldest

employee within the Specialty Structures facility,
20

Such element

and he was

the only employee RIFed.

Clearly, Thometz was treated less

favorably than younger employees in regard to the RIF.
Therefore, Thometz meets element (4) of the prima facie case.
Appellant's Brief contains no argument that element (4) was not
met, Appellant merely complains that the ALJ did not expressly
rule upon element (4).
Because the prima facie case elements are undisputed, and
because Thometz produced direct evidence of age discrimination,
the ALJ properly focused upon the essential issue in this case,
i.e., whether Thometz1 age was a determining factor in his
selection for RIF.

The ALJ expressly considered Appellant's

professed justification: "Value to Hercules was the professed
criterium which Hercules claims was the most important attribute"
(R. 756). Upon considering all of the evidence, circumstantial
and direct, the ALJ found that Appellant's professed business
justification is pretextual (R. 757).
II.

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT RELATING TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE
EVIDENCE IS PRECLUDED BY APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE
EVIDENCE, AND THE AGENCY1S DETERMINATION THAT THOMETZ WAS
TERMINATED IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 34-35-6 IS
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Appellant has failed to marshall the evidence which supports

the ALJfs findings of fact as required by Utah law.

Matter of

Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). Such failure
improperly burdens the Court and the Appellee, and constitutes
grounds for the rejection of Appellant's arguments relating to
the sufficiency of the evidence.
21

Oneido/SLIC, 872 P.2d at 1051.

Without waiving his objection based upon Appellant's failure
to marshall the evidence, Thometz addresses the specific
challenges raised by Appellant to the sufficiency of the
evidence.
Appellant's Brief argues on pages 23-25 that Thometz was
laid off as part of a general, economically motivated RIF, and
that the RIF was implemented pursuant to Appellant's nondiscriminatory RIF Policy.
length within his Order

The ALJ considered these issues at

(R. 750-754).

The fact that the RIF wherein Thometz was terminated was
economically motivated is not relevant to determining whether the
specific selection of Thometz for RIF was substantially motivated
by Thometz' age.

Age discrimination may occur in the context of

an economically-motivated RIF.

James, 21 F.3d 898; Branson, 853

F.2d 768.
Nor does the existence of a facially non-discriminatory RIF
Policy guarantee, as Appellant seems to contend, that unlawful
discrimination cannot occur, particularly where, as in the
present case, Appellant substantially failed to comply with its
RIF Policy.
Appellant's Brief argues at pages 25-26 that Nuttal
ranked Thometz at the bottom of the RIF list, and that Thometz
does not allege that such ranking by Nuttal was discriminatory.
The circumstances relating to Nuttal's ranking of Thometz are set
forth within Paragraphs 11 to 15 of the foregoing Statement of
Facts.

Nuttal supervised Thometz for only a short time
22

immediately after Thometzf transfer into the Specialty Structures
facility.

The fact that Nuttalfs ranking was not discriminatory

does not mean that Hughes ranking, and subsequent RIF of Thometz,
was not discriminatory.

The ALJ expressly considered Nuttalfs

testimony, together with all of the evidence, in reaching his
decision

(R. 756-757).

Appellant's Brief argues at pages 26-30 that the ALJ
improperly second-guessed Appellant's business judgment, in that
the ALJ considered Thometz to be more highly qualified than did
Hughes.

In fact, the ALJ not only considered Thometz to be more

qualified, he found that Hughes1 professed ignorance regarding
Thometz1 work performance and qualifications was pretextual (R.
757).

A finding of pretext does not constitute improper second-

guessing of an employer's business judgment.
The ALJ expressly recognized the distinction between secondguessing an employer's business judgment and a finding that an
employer's professed nondiscriminatory justification is
pretextual, in ruling upon Appellant's motion for judgment as a
matter of law:
The employer can make a stupid decision, make a
decision on no information as long as it's not based on
prohibited factors such as age or one of the other
factors that we've talked about. So far as what
information Ms. Hughes had with regard to him, as long
as she wasn't basing it on age, that's not prohibited.
Of course, like you say, that may be all circumstantial
evidence supporting it, supporting the case. (R. 1073).
Appellant argues upon pages 31 and 32 of its Brief that
"informational notes" regarding the protected class status of
various employees, including Thometz' age, do not constitute
23

evidence of age discrimination.
The ALJ properly held that the "informational notes" of the
PCC constitute some indication that impermissible factors were
considered (R. 756). Appellant produced no evidence as to why
this information was provided to the PCC, or of what use the PCC
made of such information, either generally or specifically in
Thometzf case.

As the ALJ noted, there was no reason for the PCC

to have such information.
selections can

The objective of nondiscriminatory RIF

be achieved by basing decisions solely upon

nondiscriminatory criteria, such as those set forth within
Appellant's RIF Policy.

The PCC!s use of information regarding

protected class status necessarily taints the PCC process.
As Appellant notes, Commissioner Thomas R. Carlson disagrees
with the ALJfs conclusion that the PCC's use of information
regarding protected class constitutes evidence of discrimination.
Nevertheless, Commissioner Carlson concurred in the ALJ's
decision in this case based upon the direct evidence of
discrimination

(R. 819).

Appellant argues at pages 32 to 34 of its Brief that the ALJ
erred as a matter of law in not considering Hughes1 comment
regarding Thometz1 age to be a "stray remark."

This issue

clearly constitutes a factual issue and not a legal issue.
Moreover, the ALJ had the benefit of observing Hughes1 testimony
regarding her comment about Thometz1 age.

The cases cited by

Appellant relating to "stray remarks" involve summary judgment
issues, rather than circumstances in which the trier of fact
24

actually observed the subject testimony.
Although there may be circumstances in which ageist remarks
are not sufficiently connected to an employment action to
establish discrimination, the ALJ found in the present case that
Hughes1 remark constituted evidence of age discrimination.
Hughes1 statement was made by the person who was directly
responsible for Thometz! RIF, during approximately the same time
frame in which she was ranking her employees for RIF.

Further,

Hughes1 comment relates directly to Thometz1 ability to perform
his work.

Considered together with the other discrepencies

within Hughes1 testimony, the ALJ reasonably found that Hughes1
comment was indicative of an age-related animus on her part.
Thometz notes that, during her testimony at the formal hearing,
Hughes gratuitously informed the ALJ that she was the youngest
person in her department at the time of Thometz1 RIF (R. 1016).
Appellant argues on pages 34 to 37 of its Brief that the ALJ
erred as a matter of law in concluding that the statistical
evidence presented in this case raises an inference of age
discrimination.

Actually, the ALJ held that the statistics which

were presented at the formal hearing did not establish age
discrimination, but that they did raise a "caution flag" (R.
752).
Most of the stastical evidence which was presented in this
case was produced by the Appellant, who called an expert
statistician, Bruce Hopkins ("Hopkins"), presumably for the
purpose of proving statistically that Appellant did not commit
25

age discrimination.

During Hopkins' testimony, it became

apparent to even the least statistically inclined person that a
substantially higher percentage of employees within the protected
age group were laid off at the time of Thometzf RIF than had been
for the three preceding RIFs (R. 815). Hopkins testified that
this fact was statistically insignificant (R. 1140).

However, it

certainly does not disprove age discrimination in the present
case.
The only statistical evidence offered by Thometz in this
case is the undisputed fact that, out of the 15 employees who
were RIFed from Appellant's Composite Structures Department at
the time of Thometz1 RIF, 9 were over the age of 40, and 8,
including Thometz, were over the age of 50

(R. 875). According

to Appellant's statistics, approximately one^-half of Appellant's
employees at the time of Thometz* RIF were over the age of 40,
and approximately one-quarter of Appellant's employees were over
the age of 50 (Appellant's Brief, pages 36^37).

Consequently,

the percentage of older employees who were laid off from Thometzf
department far exceeded their respective share of the employee
population.

This fact was relied upon by the UADD in finding in

Thometz1 favor (R. 14). However, Appellant's statistician did
not address this issue.
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III.

THE AGENCY DID NOT RULE THAT THOMETZ HAS NO DUTY TO
MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES, AND THOMETZ HAS MITIGATED HIS
DAMAGES.
Appellant asserts on page 38 of its Brief that the Agency

ruled that Thometz has no duty to mitigate his damages. However,
the Agency's Order actually states in regard to this issue:
Finally, Hercules argues Mr. Thometz has failed to
mitigate the damages he suffered from Hercules1
unlawful discrimination. However, Hercules provides no
legal or factual analysis in support of this argument.
The Industrial Commision notes that Mr. Thometz has
substantially mitigated his damages by obtaining other
employment. Furthermore, under the decisions issued in
this matter by the UADD, the ALJ, and now the
Industrial Commission, Hercules was ordered to
reinstate Mr. Thometz in his previous position.
Arguably, Mr. Thometz was under no obligation to seek
or accept work elsewhere (R. 818).
Once a plaintiff establishes unlawful discrimination and
presents evidence of damages, the employer bears the burden of
proving that the Plaintiff did not exercise reasonable diligence
in mitigating his damages.
1481, 1493 (10th Cir. 1989).

Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d
In order to carry its burden, the

employer must show that with the exercise of reasonable diligence
there was a reasonable chance that the employee might have found
comparable employment.

Donnelly v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.,

874 F.2d 402, 411 (7th Cir. 1989).
In the present case, Appellant has presented no evidence
that Thometz could have obtained comparable employment through
the exercise of reasonable diligence.

To the contrary,

Appellant's extensive RIFs over the two years prior to Thometz1
RIF, together with the general economic downturn in the aerospace
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and defense industries makes it highly unlikely that Thometz
could have found comparable employment.
Thometz reasonably mitigated his damages by obtaining
alternative employment within two months after his RIF, while
simultaneously attempting to establish his own business.
Further, Thometz1 subsequent termination of said employment when
the employer moved to Kaysville, Utah was reasonable, in view of
the commute which would be required and the fact that it was the
slow time of the year.

After such termination, Thometz again

sought and secured alternative employment.
IV.

THOMETZ SHOULD BE AWARDED BACKPAY AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
INCURRED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THIS APPEAL.
Thometz should be awarded the attorney's fees and costs

which he has incurred in defending this Appeal.

Verbraeken v.

Westinqhouse Electric Corp., 881 F.2d 1041, 1052-53 (11th Cir.
1989).

Additionally, Thometz should be awarded the backpay which

he has continued to accrue to the present time as a result of
Appellant!s refusal to comply with the Order of the Industrial
Commission.

Coates v. Nat!l Cash Register Co./ 433 F.Supp. 655,

663 (D.C. Va. 1977); Bishop v. Jelleff Assoc, 398 F.Supp. 579,
597 (D.C.D.C. 1974).
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing authorities, facts and arguments,
the Appellee Loel D. Thometz respectfully requests that the
Orders of the Administrative Law Judge and of the Industrial
Commission be affirmed, and that Thometz be awarded his costs and
attorneys fees incurred in defending this Appeal, together with
the backpay which Thometz has accrued during the pendency of this
Appeal•

.
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